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speed, and lethality. Hackworth and
England are unsparing in their depic-
tions of the martinets and incompetents
who made up a fair portion of the offi-
cer and noncommissioned officers’
corps that led soldiers into the Delta
swamps and rice paddies—beginning
with the battalion commander who
places his unit’s main base in the mid-
dle of a Viet Cong minefield, through a
commanding general more focused on
maximizing body counts for his own
career than on effectively fighting an
elusive enemy.
Despite determined opposition both
from the enemy and higher headquar-
ters, Hackworth achieved an organiza-
tional transformation of his hard-luck
battalion. The 4/39th became a skilled,
deadly foe of the Viet Cong in the
Delta, a unit that took the fight to the
enemy, taking away his initiative.
Hackworth did this through reimposi-
tion of a strict but fair discipline, intro-
duction of and training in proven and
successful fieldcraft, and leadership
from the front. There are no magic bul-
lets or technological fixes for this kind
of transformation, just simple success
on the battlefield—the enemy dies or
goes away. In the beginning of his com-
mand, Hackworth’s disciplinarian ap-
proach earned him a contract on his
head from his own soldiers. By the time
he left, one of these same soldiers
would write, “The most terrible thing
happened today. Colonel Hackworth
left. You remember the one everyone
hated, and wanted shot? Now there’s
another bounty out for him—to anyone
who can get him back.”
Steel My Soldiers’ Hearts contains the
collected practical wisdom of this suc-
cessful battalion commander. Curi-
ously, however, the wisdom that keeps
soldiers alive on the battlefield does not
necessarily contribute to the end of bat-
tles or wars. Hackworth and England
acknowledge as much in an account of
a conversation between Hackworth and
John Paul Vann. Hackworth and Vann
were compatriots and friends; Vann
had been Hackworth’s company com-
mander in Korea. Vann, now a civilian
advisor to the South Vietnamese re-
gime, told Hackworth that while his
battalion was improving the security of
the area, they were killing too many ci-
vilians. Vann added, “Once the 9th’s
out of here, I reckon that eighty to
ninety percent of the Delta’s population
will come to our side. You guys have
been the VC’s biggest recruiter. You kill
a boy’s mama, which side do you
reckon he’ll join?”
Therein lies the major lesson of this
frank, valuable book. A nation’s armed
forces can be exceptionally well trained,
exceptionally lethal, and full of esprit de
corps. They can win all the battles. They
can maximize the body count. But if the
end of the battle or war is flawed—or
worse, uncertain—no amount of cour-
age, steel, or personal battlefield leader-




Taubman, Philip. Secret Empire: Eisenhower, the
CIA and the Hidden Story of America’s Space Espi-
onage. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003.
441pp. $27
That the United States has conducted a
program of high-altitude and space-
borne photographic reconnaissance
since the mid-1950s is hardly a secret.
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With the public release of many previ-
ously classified source documents and
project histories, the time is right for
Philip Taubman’s history of the strate-
gic issues, politics, personalities, and
technologies that drove the develop-
ment of America’s extraordinary space
reconnaissance capability.
Taubman has reported on national secu-
rity and intelligence matters for the New
York Times for more than twenty years.
He is clearly a thorough researcher; his
list of consulted sources, documents,
and technical reports runs to eighteen
pages of small print. Much of it is mate-
rial new to the public domain.
Strange as it may seem today, when the
United States is rich in strategic intelli-
gence, in the early 1950s it had no reli-
able estimate of the numbers of
strategic bombers, missiles, or nuclear
warheads in the Soviet Union. As
Winston Churchill said, the USSR was
“a riddle wrapped in an enigma.” Bison
bombers flew circles around Moscow to
inflate the estimates of Western air
attachés of their numbers; Nikita
Khrushchev rattled rockets to add to
the noise.
In this murky but threatening environ-
ment, the Eisenhower administration
was struggling to develop a balanced
defense policy, one that would offer ef-
fective defense against an opponent
whose capabilities and intentions were
imperfectly known, but one that would
not break the nation’s economy. Hard
strategic intelligence—reconnaissance-
based counts of strategic things—was
key. However, the Soviet Union was
then what was picturesquely called “a
denied area.” RB-47s and similar air-
craft probed the borders but could not
see deeply into the Soviet Union, and
their reconnaissance flights often ended
in political embarrassment for the gov-
ernment and tragedy for the crews.
At this point, a collection of remarkable
men entered the game: Edwin Land of
Polaroid, a politically well connected
systems engineer; Kelly Johnson, head
of Lockheed’s fabled “Skunk Works”
and builder of extraordinary aircraft;
James Baker of Harvard, a most creative
camera-system designer; and Arthur
Lundhal of the CIA, a gifted photo-
graphic interpreter. Richard Bissell, the
CIA’s legendary manager of high-risk
projects, assumed the leadership of this
gang and with it brought the fabled U-2
high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft
and later the first photographic recon-
naissance satellites, Corona, to opera-
tional fulfillment.
Taubman paints these men unreserv-
edly as patriots, putting their consider-
able technical skills and imagination at
their country’s service. That they were.
More importantly, they grasped the
need for hard strategic intelligence and
had the perspective to see the promise
of new technologies and their applica-
tion to the problem of strategic
reconnaissance.
The author does a splendid job of inter-
preting the significance of the technical
problems encountered and the brilliant
ingenuity of the solutions. Aircraft had
never operated at the combination of
altitude (over seventy thousand feet)
and range (beyond three thousand
miles) that strategic overflight of the
Soviet Union would require. The solu-
tion from Johnson’s Skunk Works was
the U-2, a sort of jet-powered glider
with the climb characteristics of a
homesick angel. Baker designed cam-
eras with long focal lengths that folded
into tight fuselage and satellite spaces;
Kodak developed films that could
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survive the temperature extremes en-
countered at reconnaissance altitudes;
Lundhal organized a photographic
interpretation activity to receive and
analyze the pictures.
When satellite-borne cameras replaced
the U-2, new and even more demand-
ing technical problems arose. Just get-
ting a satellite launched and into orbit
was no mean trick. Choosing between
relaying television pictures from space
or returning exposed film was a subtle
and demanding technical choice. Re-
covery of the exposed film was selected
and became the coolest trick of all: film
capsules, ejected from the satellite, re-
entered the atmosphere and parachuted
down to where a specially equipped
C-130 snagged them out of the air.
All this seems quite ordinary today, but
in the 1950s these were innovative
technical accomplishments. Too often
strategic histories treat critical technical
accomplishments lightly and gloss over
their significance to strategic and policy
choices. To Taubman’s credit, he is at-
tuned to the importance of the enabling
technologies and brings their role and
impact to the reader’s understanding.
After getting the cameras aloft,
Taubman turns his attention to the
consequences of the pictures they re-
turned. The first flights captured stag-
gering numbers of detailed pictures
covering vast sweeps of the hidden inte-
rior of the Soviet Union. The pictures
revealed that Soviet Bison bombers
were as rare as the animal is today in
Montana and that Soviet intercontinen-
tal missiles, while large and ugly, were
few and in a low state of readiness.
This did not end the Cold War or put
America completely at ease, but it did
bring some balance and scope to
defense planning for the late 1950s. In
1960 a presidential candidate who
should be remembered for better things
rode to victory partly on claims that the
Eisenhower administration had allowed
a dangerous missile gap to grow. The
pictures from these satellites and air-
craft put paid to that.
Taubman’s book is twice valuable—
first, for its historical development of
the value and impact of strategic intelli-
gence, and second, for its insight into
the role of technology and technologists
in shaping strategic policy.
In his final pages, Taubman raises im-
portant questions about America’s cur-
rent reliance on technical intelligence
collection methods. He notes that little
about al-Qa‘ida’s activities or capabili-
ties is being revealed or forecast by sat-
ellite reconnaissance and that human
intelligence sources and the collection
of intelligence must play a central role
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When we look back on great historical
events, we often ascribe an inevitability
to things that were, in fact, anything but.
In this lucid and comprehensive study of
the formulation and enactment of the
Marshall Plan, John Bonds recounts how
this great pillar of American post–World
War II policy was anything but inevita-
ble. Bonds, a retired captain of the U.S.
Navy and professor of history at the
Citadel in Charlestown, South Carolina,
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